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54602 Villers-Us-Nancy, France Email: nassar@loria.fr 615, rue du jardin botanique 54602 Villers-Us-Nancy, France Email: festor@loria.fr Abstract-Voice over IP (VoIP) and the Session Initiation P rotocol (SIP) are establishing themselves as strong players in the field of multimedia communications over IP, leveraged by low cost services and easy management. Nevertheless, the security aspects
are not yet fully mastered. In this paper we present an open-source implementation of a VoIP SIP-specific honeypot named Artemisa.
The honey pot is designed to connect to a VoIP enterprise domain as a back-end user-agent in order to detect malicious activity at an early stage. Moreover, the honey pot can play a role in the real time adjustment of the security policies of the enterprise domain where it is deployed. We aim, by this contribution, to encourage the deployment of such honeypots at large scale and the collection of attack traces. We test the capacity of the honeypot to handle a series of known SIP attacks and present results from diverse scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
Voice over IP (VoIP) is quickly hitting the market after the establishment of the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP [9] ) as the de-facto standard signaling protocol in the Internet and the IP Multimedia Subsystems (lMS). Basically, SIP allows two com municating parties to establish, modify and terminate a media session. The media session is described through the Session Description Protocol (SDP) body carried by the SIP messages. A SIP enterprise domain is typically composed of user premises (hard and soft-phones), a SIP infrastructure (e.g., proxy, reg istrar, back-to-back user-agent) and supporting services (e.g., web-based management, TFTP, DNS).
VoIP has not only the inherited security problems of the network layers, but also new threats and vulnerabilities. The [2] . The future of the VoIP security is hard to be predicted today, mostly because of the lack of information about security incidents and exploits.
In front of these threats, innovative security approaches should be extended to cover this arena. In particular, the information gathering and the early warning systems are widely deployed in computer networks today as an important security component. The honeypots and the honeynets constitute an important factor in order to know what are the real dangers and what the attackers methodologies will be [13] . We do adapt this concept to the VoIP sphere.
In this context, we propose an architectural design together with an open-source implementation of a VoIP SIP-specific honeypot that can be deployed as a user-agent back-end in a VoIP enterprise domain. Because of the fact that the honeypot extensions do not represent real users, every activity targeting them is perceived as suspicious. The honeypot answers the calls and records them along with the SIP trace. The honeypot is able to classify many kinds of anomalies and report them to the administrator or automatically control the security policy of the domain under protection. The typical honeypot deployment configuration is depicted in Figure 1 : the honeypot registers to one or several SIP registrars and waits for calls and SIP messages. Two options are possible: The first option is to connect the honeypot in the demilitarized zone. Thus it will be isolated from the internal network and the VoIP VLAN in case the machine running it is compromised. The second option is to connect it through the Internet as many VoIP providers today has subscribers from all over the globe across the Internet.
The rest of this paper is composed as follows: In Section 2 we expose related work on VoIP security and honeypots. Section 3 describes the functional goals of our design. In Section 4 we expand the software architecture and expose implementation details. Experimentation and results are shown in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and presents the future works.
II. RELATED WORK
VoIP security has stimulated the enterprises, research and government communities to investigate the best ways of as suring its different security aspects. General recommendations for a safe VoIP deployment are defined in [14] , [1] , [5] . Several books have already been published on this topic [12] . Geneiatakis et al. [4] One of the issues that is extensively studied is the SPIT problem. The key issue with SPIT identification is the caller identity. Quittek et al. [8] Regarding the announced security events, one concludes that malicious attempts are in their infancy. There are many "hacking" tools, however, that can be taken "off-the-shelf" and used by script kiddies. We aim by this contribution to encourage the deployment of VoIP honey pots on large and early scales before the proliferation of large-scale attacks.
III. FUNCTIONAL GOALS
The honeypot registers several series of virtual extensions at one or more SIP registrars. The virtual extensions have to be 
A. Enumeration detection
An enumeration is detected as a series of OPTIONS, REG ISTER or INV ITE messages addressed to a series of virtual extensions. The attack source must be able to receive the re sponses in order to analyse them. In active mode, our honeypot gathers information about the source (e.g., the attack tool, the user-agent, the IP address and domain, the geographical location, the autonomous system number) and reports them to 
E. Configuring the honeypot
The honeypot functionalities are defined through a behavior mode represented by a state machine. The state machine is described using rules and fine-grained operations. Customized modes can be defined by the administrator. In addition, we define two primitive modes: passive and active. In passive mode, the honeypot does not use any networking tool hence does not send any request that may unveil its presence. In active mode and when the honey pot reveals that the attack source is real, it tries to collect information about it such as: the SIP fingerprint, the underlying operating system fingerprint, the IP route, the opened ports and services (several opened ports might indicate that many sessions are maintained in parallel).
All these operations are supported by a modular and extensible architecture as described next.
IV. HONEY POT MODULES A ND IMPLEMENTATION
Artemisa is composed of several modules bundled together using the P ython scripting language. These modules are de picted in Figure 2 . The Tcpdump module controls the collection of the raw network traffic at the honeypot machine using the This component invokes the following tools:
• Dig: being the alternative of the former Nslookup, this tool is used for querying the DNS records. It performs DNS and Reverse DNS lookups.
• jwhois: being an Internet W hois, this tool helps to obtain publicly available information about the domain names involved in the SIP message.
• Sipsak7: this is a SIP tool that can make different SIP tests such as sending an OP TIONS message to a target URI.
• Nmap8: this is an efficient scanning tool that we can use to scan the caller's host and determine if SIP, media, or
both ports are open.
• Traceroute: helps trace the IP routes toward the different SIP proxies and UAs involved in the SIP message.
• pOf: is a passive fingerprinting tool that helps us retrieve additional information about the source such as the oper ating system.
The collected information are formatted and supplied to the set of classification and correlation rules. from a dial-plan error (why this message is routed to the honeypot while it does not address a virtual extension?).
Other checks apply to the overall dialog as initiated by this INVITE message. The honeypot answers with a 200 OK and waits for ACK and media. If received, the dialog is considered as SPIT. Otherwise, the INVITE needs to be correlated with other events because it could be part of a scanning (trying to reach a gateway to the PSTN or valid extensions) or a ringing attempt (ringing all the phones in the target domains). We give the administrator the ability to define the inves tigation process operations, and the rules to be applied on the investigation results, hence to control the decision process of the honeypot. The classification rules are placed under a context (for example the received INVITE message) and are composed of a pre-action, a condition and an action. We use a simple attribute = value syntax to describe the rules. For example, the first node of the aforementioned decision tree can be represented by the following rule: 
E. Rule-based correlation
The correlation rules are applied when several SIP messages are used to infer a conclusion. We define different types of correlation rules. These types are particularly needed to detect flooding, scanning and SPIT series of events.
This type of rules support timer and threshold attributes. For example, the following rule is used to check if an ACK is received after an INVITE in a time window of 5 seconds. *************** Information about the call ***************** 
H. Results, alerts, and e-mail notification
We have two type of alerts:
• A message alert: contains all the conclusions that are inferred about a SIP message,
• A composed alert: contains information about a list of correlated SIP messages.
The alerts are provided to the corrunand line interface and logged in text and HTML formats. The honeypot can be configured to send alerts to the administrator by e-mail. An example of a message alert is shown in Figure 5 .
The honeypot source code is distributed under the GPLv31 0 license. The latest release is available at the project home page:
http://artemisa.sourceforge.netl.
V. EXPERIMENTATION A ND CA SE STUDIES
We extensively tested the honeypot performance in terms of robustness and accuracy. The goal of the robustness tests is to ensure that the honeypot does not easily crash when it is targeted by attacks or when it is abnormally flooded. The goal of the accuracy tests is to verify that it makes the good interpretation of received SIP messages.
In the sequel, we start by showing the offline interpretation of a SIP message detected by a deployed sensor. After that, we present our test-bed and summarize the results of 4 scenarios involving several attack tools. We show how responses can be triggered at parallel protection levels.
A. Interpretation of a SIP message
The INVITE message depicted in Figure 6 is reported by the Norwegian chapter (http://www.honeynor.no/2009/09l20/ citibank-uk-number-was-target-for-a-Iawnmower-telephone attack-today/). We assume that this message is received by our honeypot and interpreted by the classifier decision tree.
The following remarks are obtained: Figure 6 . An INVITE from an attack trace
• The User-Agent header is missing:
We cannot estimate what tool has been used.
• Check DNS returns negative. The IP in the SDP (1.1.1.1)
shows that the message is spoofed.
• Check if host is up and if SIP, media, or both ports are open: The host and ports are surely not available.
• Check for ACK and received media: No media delivery or ACK are noticed.
At this level, the received message is reported as spoofed: No real SIP state machine is involved at the attacker side. The used IP is spoofed or it belongs to a compromised machine.
To get the overall picture, the other reported messages must be 1) The goal of the attacker may be making maximum disturbance by ringing all the phones in the domain. This is likely true if the attack persists.
2) The goal of the attacker is to enumerate the possible extensions in the domain. This is likely true if a large set of extensions is targeted (user part of the request URI). One can wonder, however, why the attacker does not use OPTIONS scanning which is more stealthy. In the same time, one cannot assume the logical behavior of the attacker.
3) The goal is to identify the gateways SIP/P STN. This is true if a few messages are targeting several gateways (domain part of the request URI).
B. Testing against attack tools P hysically our test-bed is composed of two machines: The first machine contains the honeypot and an Asteriskll PBX server. The second machine contains two bridged virtual ma chines: one representing the attacking tools and one having a soft-phone to emulate a legal external caller. We use a hard phone to represent a user of the Asterisk server that has to be protected. The hardphone registers extension "305" at the Asterisk server. The honeypot registers extensions "300-304"
and "306-310" in order to protect the targeted extension from both sides. Another option is to configure Asterisk to forward all the calls towards unregistered extensions to the honeypot.
Next we give 4 case studies and we show how the honeypot can react and help to support the test-bed domain security. In the future, we aim to discover vulnerabilities in the VoIP hacking tools by using "fuzzing" techniques 12. The discovered vulnerabilities will be incorporated into the response scripts used by the honeypot to counter-attack the malicious sources.
1) Catch and crash
2) Catch and block SPIT at the dial-plan level: In this scenario ( Figure 7) , we launch the Spitter tool [3] against our domain. When the honey pot detects the delivered SPIT calls, it adds the source to a blacklist in the Asterisk database (AstDb).
The hardphone extension is protected by an AGI (Asterisk Gateway Interface) script within the Asterisk dial-plan. In other words every time this extension is called, the AGI script is run first. The AGI script checks if the call source is blacklisted before forwarding the call to the destination. In this way, the SPIT calls are blocked while the "good" calls are still routed.
The blacklisting is based on the IP address for an external source and on the SIP URI for an internal (registered) source.
3) Catch and block a scanning at the IP level: In this scenario, we launch a scanning attempt against our domain.
W hen the honeypot classifies the received message as scan, it adds a firewall rule at the IP firewall level (IPTables) in order to block the attack at an early stage.
4) Fingerprint a bunch of SIP attacking tools:
We launch a bunch of SIP hacking tools against the honey pot in order to test its robustness. Particularly, the SIP parsing robustness is . 12"Fuzzing is a method for finding bugs and vulnerabilities by creating different types of packets for the target protocol that push its specifications to the breaking point." [3] • PROTOS Test-Suit (c07-sip): a SIP Torture Test that allows sending a major amount of malformed messages; • Sipscan [3] : supports REGISTER, OPTIONS and INVITE scanning;
• SIPVicious: enumerates SIP servers in a given IP range by sending OPTIONS or INVITE messages;
• Inviteflood [3] : simple tool that allows several types of flooding based attacks;
• Sipp: allows testing the SIP servers performances under stress conditions;
• Sipsak: cOlmnand-line SIP testing tool helpful for flooding and robustness tests;
• Spitter: works over Asterisk and automatically generates calls with an audio message to be delivered;
• SIP Send Funl3: supports several fuzzy INVITE messages for robustness testing;
• SipBotl4: remotely controlled SIP attack tool supporting several attack conunands.
• VoIPERI5: a set of several tools for attacks like fuzzing and torturing.
The honeypot software shows good performance in terms of robustness: no crash is noticed even against the fuzzing and the flooding tools. It also demonstrates good performances in terms of the interpretation accuracy. This is the advantage of the rule- based approach when dealing with well-known attacks. We are able to identify and fingerprint all the attack tools. The results are summarized in Table I The software has been extensively tested and demonstrated to be ready for incorporation in production domains. Also, to our knowledge, this is the first study on the fingerprinting and characterization of the existing VoIP "script-kiddies" tools. We aim by this contribution to encourage the deployment of VoIP honeypot sensors in order to build a security expertise in this field at an early stage.
In the future, we will provide a complete reference for Artemisa's rule description: syntax, rule types, attributes, oper ators, keywords and built-in operations. We will also study how to improve the processing performance of the honey pot when the size of the rule set increases.
Another goal is to develop domain honeypots that are more attractive in order to trap more sophisticated attackers. We want to innovate means to emulate high financial values such as gateway connections to the PSTN, premium-rate numbers or the telephony network of a prestigious business. Domain honeypots should regroup SIP infrastructures, PBX services, and individual user agent honeypots such as Artemisa.
We aim to incorporate the honeypot in state of the art VoIP intrusion detection systems such as SPIT prevention, ad vanced fingerprinting and anomaly-payload detection systems.
We therefore have to define the interaction of the honeypot with the other security components in order to enable real time and efficient adaptation of the security policy in the VoIP 
